Gabriel Leon-Ablan

Professor of Political Economy



Contact

Professor of Political Economy


Curriculum vitae


Department of Political Economy

King's College London

Email: gabriel.leon_ablan@kcl.ac.uk
Twitter: gabrieljleon
Bluesky: gabrielleon.bsky.social



Gabriel Leon-Ablan

Professor of Political Economy


Department of Political Economy

King's College London

Email: gabriel.leon_ablan@kcl.ac.uk
Twitter: gabrieljleon
Bluesky: gabrielleon.bsky.social



The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes


Book chapter


Toke Aidt, Gabriel Leon
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2, Oxford University Press, 2019


Cite

Cite

APA   Click to copy
Aidt, T., & Leon, G. (2019). The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.15


Chicago/Turabian   Click to copy
Aidt, Toke, and Gabriel Leon. “The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes.” In The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2. Oxford University Press, 2019.


MLA   Click to copy
Aidt, Toke, and Gabriel Leon. “The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes.” The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2, Oxford University Press, 2019, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.15.


BibTeX   Click to copy

@incollection{aidt2019a,
  title = {The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.15},
  author = {Aidt, Toke and Leon, Gabriel},
  booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2}
}

Abstract: Coups, understood as attempts to overthrow the sitting executive government by a group inside the state apparatus that includes part of the military, shape competition for office in authoritarian regimes. They do that both directly through actual coups and indirectly through the threat of a coup, which forces incumbent autocrats to balance loyalty and repression to pre-empt being overthrown. The chapter presents a framework for the study of coups and uses it to examine how coups can help select autocrats and to some extent keep them accountable. It presents a number of stylized facts about coups and summarizes the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of coups in autocracies.

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