Gabriel Leon-Ablan

Professor of Political Economy



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Professor of Political Economy


Curriculum vitae


Department of Political Economy

King's College London

Email: gabriel.leon_ablan@kcl.ac.uk
Twitter: gabrieljleon
Bluesky: gabrielleon.bsky.social



Gabriel Leon-Ablan

Professor of Political Economy


Department of Political Economy

King's College London

Email: gabriel.leon_ablan@kcl.ac.uk
Twitter: gabrieljleon
Bluesky: gabrielleon.bsky.social



Feudalism, Collaboration and Path Dependence in England’s Political Development


Journal article


Gabriel Leon
British Journal of Political Science, vol. 50, 2020, pp. 511–533


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APA   Click to copy
Leon, G. (2020). Feudalism, Collaboration and Path Dependence in England’s Political Development. British Journal of Political Science, 50, 511–533. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000825


Chicago/Turabian   Click to copy
Leon, Gabriel. “Feudalism, Collaboration and Path Dependence in England’s Political Development.” British Journal of Political Science 50 (2020): 511–533.


MLA   Click to copy
Leon, Gabriel. “Feudalism, Collaboration and Path Dependence in England’s Political Development.” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 50, 2020, pp. 511–33, doi:10.1017/S0007123417000825.


BibTeX   Click to copy

@article{leon2020a,
  title = {Feudalism, Collaboration and Path Dependence in England’s Political Development},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
  pages = {511–533},
  volume = {50},
  doi = {10.1017/S0007123417000825},
  author = {Leon, Gabriel}
}

Abstract: This article presents a formal model of path dependence inspired by England’s history. The introduction of feudalism after the Norman Conquest – the critical juncture – created a large elite that rebelled frequently. The king fought these revolts with the help of collaborators he recruited from the masses. In compensation, he made these collaborators members of the elite. This was a cost-effective form of compensation: rents were only partly rival, and so new elite members only partially diluted the rents received by the king. The dilution from adding new members decreased as the elite grew in size, generating positive feedback and path dependence. This mechanism can account for the extension of rights in England in the early stages of its journey towards democracy.

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